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Letter	  to	  Editor	  The	   symbiosis	   between	   plants	   and	   arbuscular	   mycorrhizal	   fungi	   has	   been	   described	   as	   a	  biological	  market	  based	  on	  evidence	  that	  plants	  supply	  more	  carbohydrates	  to	  fungal	  partners	  that	   provide	  more	   soil	   nutrients,	   and	   vice	   versa1–4.	  Walder	  &	  Van	  der	  Heijden’s	   	   (WH)	   recent	  paper	   challenges	   this	   view5.	   However,	   WH’s	   challenge	   is	   based	   upon	   misunderstandings	   of	  biological	  market	  theory,	  and	  evolutionary	  theory	  more	  generally.	  	  	  First,	   WH’s	   claim	   that	   biological	   market	   theory	   requires	   (or	   assumes)	   tightly-­‐coupled	   direct	  resource	   exchange	   is	   incorrect.	   All	   that	   is	   required	   is	   that	   individuals	   have	   a	   preference	   on	  
average	   for	   interacting	   with	   more	   beneficial	   partners6–9.	   Biological	   market	   theory	   makes	   no	  claim	   on	   understanding	   (proximate)	   mechanisms	   of	   transfer	   processes.	   This	   is	   not	   its	   aim.	  Instead,	   biological	   market	   theory	   addresses	   ultimate	   questions	   such	   as	   why	   partnerships	  remain	   stable	   over	   evolutionary	   time,	   even	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   less	   beneficial	   partners.	   Its	  usefulness	   lies	   in	  predicting	  how	   these	  exchanges	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  context,	   such	  as	  varying	  environmental	  conditions7,8,10–12.	  	  	  	  Second,	   WH	   suggest	   that	   the	   “most	   prominent	   fact”	   challenging	   a	   market-­‐based	   view	   of	   the	  mutualism	   is	   the	   occurrence	   of	   antagonistic	   or	   parasitic	   interactions.	   However,	   this	   claim	  reveals	   a	   key	   misunderstanding	   of	   biological	   market	   theory,	   and	   mutualism	   evolution	   in	  general.	  The	  persistence	  of	  some	  parasitism	  is	  actually	  expected	  under	  biological	  market	  theory,	  which	  predicts	  neither	  complete	  disappearance	  of	  cheating	  nor	  perfect	  partner	  choice8,9,13,14.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  prediction,	  we	  observe	  that	  parasitic	  interactions	  remain	  a	  small,	  but	  observable,	  proportion	  of	  global	  mycorrhizal	  interactions15.	  	  	  Third,	  the	  authors	  claim	  that	  plant-­‐derived	  carbon	  is	  available	  to	  fungal	  symbionts	  as	  a	  “public	  good”	  (i.e.	   individuals	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  excluded	  from	  its	  use).	  Both	  theory	  and	  physiology	  argue	   against	   this	   scenario.	   Theory	   unambiguously	   predicts	   that	   symbiotic	   persistence	   is	  facilitated	   by	   the	   evolution	   of	   adaptations	   to	   exclude	   less	   beneficial	   partners,	   such	   that	   free	  access	   to	   resources	   is	   restricted16–18.	   This	   is	   backed	  by	  physiological	   evidence	  of	   (1)	   localized	  carbon	  delivery	  to	  the	   fungus,	  namely	  the	  evolution	  of	   intracellular	  structures	  (e.g.	  arbuscules	  and	   coils)	   that	   facilitate	   the	   directed	   transfer	   of	   nutrients,	   and	   (2)	   knockdown	   and	   gene-­‐silencing	  studies	  suggesting	  cell-­‐specific	  nutrient	  supply	  determines	  arbuscule	  longevity	  (19	  for	  review).	  
	   	  
Fourth,	  WH	  claim	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  specificity	  in	  the	  mycorrhizal	  symbiosis	  is	  evidence	  against	  the	  existence	  of	  partner	   choice.	  This	   claim	   is	  based	  on	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	  existing	   theory,	  which	  predicts	  the	  opposite.	  Biological	  market	  theory	  predicts	  that	  low	  specificity,	  with	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  potential	  partners,	   facilitates	   the	  evolution	  of	   stable	   trading6,7,20.	  As	  a	  host	  you	  can	  gain	  more	  when	  you	  have	   the	  potential	   to	   interact	  with	  multiple	   fungal	   strains,	   in	   contrast	   to	  being	   ‘locked-­‐in’	   to	   one	   partner7,20.	   This	   is	   especially	   true	   in	   variable	   environmental	  conditions10,11.	  	  Fifth,	   the	   authors	   argue	   that	   in	   complex	   networks	   (i.e.	   multiple	   plants	   and	   multiple	   fungi),	  partner	   choice	   may	   be	   “difficult	   and	   less	   effective”.	   This	   claim	   is	   likewise	   based	   on	   a	  misunderstanding	   of	   existing	   theory,	  which	  makes	   the	   opposite	   prediction7.	   The	   authors	   also	  argue	   that	   “spatial	   separation	   may	   serve	   as	   a	   critical	   precondition”	   for	   discrimination5.	  However,	   there	   are	   mixed	   findings	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   spatial	   structure,	   both	  experimentally1,2,21	  and	  theoretically8,21,22,	  but	   the	  variation	  we	  find	   in	  the	  precision	  of	  partner	  choice	   among	   species22	   and	   under	   different	   conditions4,24	   is	   actually	   expected,	   and	   again	  consistent	  with	  theory9	  .	  	  	  	  Sixth,	  WH	  suggest	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  partner	  identity,	  environmental	  conditions,	  and	  available	  external	  resources	  all	  vary	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  affect	  trading	  choices.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  -­‐	  this	  is	  how	  markets	  work,	  both	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  practice6–8,10,11,24.	  In	  contrast	  to	  what	  the	  authors	  claim,	  variable	  rewards	  and	  changing	  partner	  preferences	  are	  the	  defining	  feature	  of	  biological	  markets6,7,19.	  	  	  	  The	   goal	   of	   biological	   market	   theory	   is	   not	   to	   draw	   analogies	   to	   human	   markets.	   Rather,	  biological	   market	   theory	   is	   a	   tool	   to	   analyse	   exchange	   patterns.	   When	   applied	   correctly,	   it	  allows	  scientists	  to	  make	  testable	  predictions	  about	  resource	  exchange	  patterns,	  and	  how	  these	  vary	   across	   species	   and	   environment10,12,20,25.	   In	   the	   past,	  mycorrhizal	   researchers	   could	   only	  vaguely	   refer	   to	   “context-­‐dependency”	   to	   explain	   the	   variability	   in	   their	   results.	   Biological	  market	   theory	   now	   allows	   us	   to	   dissect	   this	   variability	   and	   generate	   specific	   and	   precise	  predictions	  for	  plant-­‐mycorrhizal	  outcomes7,8,11,12,20.	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